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ABSTRACT  
Scientific realists argue that a good track record of  multi-agent, and multiple method, validation of  
empirical claims is itself  evidence that those claims, at least partially and approximately, reflect ways 
nature actually is independent of  the ways we conceptualize it.  Constructivists contend that 
successes in validating empirical claims only suffice to establish that our ways of  modelling the 
world, our “constructions,” are useful and adequate for beings like us.  This essay presents a thought 
experiment in which beings like us intersubjectively validate claims about properties of  particular 
things in nature under conditions in which those beings have profoundly different personal 
phenomenological experiences of  those properties.  I submit that the thought experiment scenario 
parallels our actual situation, and argue that this shows that successes in intersubjectively validating 
empirical claims are indeed enough to claim victory for the realist.  More specifically, I champion a 
variation of  realism that marries Ronald Giere’s brand of  ‘perspectival realism’ with Philip Kitcher’s 
‘real realism,’ and posits that causal relations between ourselves and properties instantiated in nature 
ground our references to the relevant properties even though our conceptions of  them are 
perspective relative (or filtered through, and distorted by, a perspective).  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Two sighted persons may each perceive the same patch of  sky as being of  different shades, as in the 
color swatches below, but both explicitly agree that that patch is the same shade of  blue.  For 
example, they might agree that that patch of  sky is the exact same color as shade #0064 of  a 
particular brand of  paint. 
 
    
 
Although the degree of  disparity in each of  our subjective phenomenological content may not be as 
severe as in the above swatches—given biological contingencies and variability—this situation is 
certainly to some extent indicative of  our own.1  This essay examines situations like this, what I will 
call ‘invisible disagreement’ situations, that can and do occur between perceiving beings like us.  I 
will argue that the fact that ‘invisible disagreements’ occur breaks the alleged “tie between the 
                                                          
1 There is an enormous amount of  neuroscience research establishing that phenomenal content can vary drastically 
across subjects perceiving the same things.  Color-blindness and other color perception disorders serve as obvious, 
severe, examples.  For instance, ‘synesthesia’ is a well-documented condition in which a brain activity abnormality can 
result in perceiving black and grey text (letters and numerals) in character-isomorphic colors—e.g. Q’s may always appear 
red to someone with the condition; see Robertson & Sagiv 2004 and Byrne & Hilbert 2003 and the sources cited therein. 
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empiricist stance and the metaphysical stance”—the tie between scientific constructivism and 
realism (Psillos 2013, p. 35). 
 Constructivists see “realist affirmations as going beyond what the evidence demands” (Sober 
2008, p. 129).  They hold that the only “reality” we are justified in claims to empirical knowledge 
about is our models of  the natural world, on grounds that there is no evidence available to found the 
realist idea that our empirical claims are true to model-independent reality.  This is the prevailing 
view in science and the philosophy thereof.  In the popular science literature, Stephan Hawking 
defends constructivsm calling it “model-dependent realism” (see 2011, p. 45) and in the philosophy 
of  science Bas van Frassen has defended the most mature formulation of  it calling it “constructive 
empiricism” since the 1980’s (see van Frassen 2002; 1989; 1980).  And, historically, the view has been 
a dominant one in philosophy in general, since Kant dubbed it “empirical realism” in his famous 
synthesis of  the views of  Bishop Berkeley and David Hume (CPR A369-70). 
 In rebut of  the received constructivist stance, I will argue that ‘invisible disagreements’ are 
most probably a persistent feature of  our situation and can only be sufficiently accounted for with a 
realist epistemology.  Specifically, I will contend that the occurrence of  ‘invisible disagreements’ can 
only be accounted for with an epistemology according to which multiple perceiving agents 
intersubjectively validate empirical claims by accurately pointing to properties instantiated in model-
independent reality.  I will defend this conclusion by laying out an intuition-pump style thought 
experiment that highlights the implications of  ‘invisible disagreements’ and serves to show why 
realism prevails over constructivism. 
 As a first pass characterization, an ‘invisible disagreement’ is essentially a situation like the 
one described above, in which there is a lack of  intersubjective disagreement about qualities 
attributed to things in the world even though there are intrasubjective (perceiver-isomorphic) 
disparities—that is, disagreement in the phenomenological content of  the agents validating claims 
about the salient qualities.  The thought experiment presented below (in §5) expands upon this basic 
situation, and thereby illustrates how a community of  perceiving beings like us can communicate 
about and collectively navigate the world quite well without such phenomenological disparities ever 
becoming the source of  explicit disagreements about empirical claims.  In so doing, it provides 
insights into the way in which we interface with perceiver-independent reality and into the grounds 
of  agreement and disagreement about empirical claims.  Most notably, it will come to light that a 
realist epistemology can account for invisible disagreements, and that a constructivist one cannot.  
The presented thought experiment also bears implications for how realism can be most reasonably 
formulated, and I will argue that the experiment suggests that a specific interpretation of  Ronald 
Giere’s (2006 and 1999) ‘perspectival realism’ beats out the prevailing constructivist stance.2  
Accordingly, I will champion a variation of  realism that marries Giere’s brand of  ‘perspectival 
realism’ with Philip Kitcher’s ‘real realism,’ and posits that causal connections between ourselves and 
properties instantiated in nature ground our references to the relevant properties even though our 
conceptions of  them are perspective relative (or filtered through, and distorted by, a perspective). 
2.  THE CRUX OF THE REALIST/CONSTRUCTIVIST DEBATE 
Constructivists and realists mostly agree that the ways we represent and communicate about the 
world are instrumentally productive and that it is valuable, and therefore rational, to believe in the 
                                                          
2 The discussion herein also bears significant implications for current debates in action theory that are outside the scope 
of  this work; see Bradley 2011, Ward et al 2011, Noë 2004, and Pettit 2003. 
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entities we posit to make sense of  natural phenomena.3  They can also agree that the seemingly 
robustly existent, “worldly,” entities of  everyday life (e.g. tables and chairs) and those studied in the 
natural sciences (e.g. organisms and atoms) exist in the sense that there is something out in nature with 
which we causally interact (see Sider 2012, p. 165).  As Philip Kitcher says:  
Our purchase on the idea that some objects are independent of  some of  us (although 
observed by others) suffices to make intelligible the thought that some objects are 
independent of  all of  us, that they would have existed even if  there had been no humans (or 
other sapient creatures), even though, had that been so, there would have been no 
observation of  them or thought about them. (2001, p. 183)   
Philosophers certainly do not agree that there are objects independent of  our conceptions of  the 
world.4  Still, global skepticism is not among the scientifically respectable positions.  The substantive 
dispute that remains between the realist and the constructivist concerns the aboutness of  empirical 
claims and the aboutness of  the conceptual models in terms of  which they are spelt out (cf. 
Bickhard 1998).  The constructivist maintains that our only warranted claim is that well-
corroborated empirical claims ground out in our models, or abstract constructions that we treat as 
true for practical reasons.  The realist contends that well-corroborated claims ground to properties 
instantiated in nature, and maintain that such empirical claims track truths about nature.  As Kitcher 
puts it, their dispute “turns on whether determinate relations of  reference can exist without 
metaphysical pointing,” and so to gain the upper-hand the realist must establish that empirical claims 
are not “model-theoretic permutations” by showing that causal connections between ourselves and 
things in nature fixes our references to them (Kitcher 2001, p. 184). 
 Realists commonly attempt to establish as much with corroboration arguments, according to 
which intersubjective validations of  empirical claims by independent means, combined with a “no 
miracles” attitude, is supposed to compel one to favor realism.  Many realists also appeal to the fact 
that our ways of  envisaging worldly things are useful for getting around in the world, as evidence 
that those models are in large part true to model-independent reality; just as a map helping one 
successfully navigate terrain serves as evidence of  its accuracy (Wimsatt 2007, pp. 391-2; cf. 
Chakravartty 2007, p. 47).  Although I too will present a sort of  corroboration argument for realism, 
my overall argument will in certain respects move away from the idea that well-corroborated and 
useful empirical claims follow from accurate models.  This is in the sense that my thought 
experiment below will establish that the phenomenological content of  perceivers, their 
intrasubjective ways of  envisaging things in nature, need not be in accord in order for them to 
referentially point to and validate the instantiation of  the same properties.5 
3.  QUALIA,  QUALITIES,  PROPERTIES, AND INVERTED-QUALIA 
The thought experiment presented in §4 is at base a pretty standard “inverted qualia” or “inverted 
spectrum” experiment (in the vein of  Locke 1689 Bk. II, Ch. xxvii and Block & Fodor 1972).  
However, in the discussion that follows I will use certain terms that are commonly used when 
talking about inverted spectrum scenarios in specific and restricted ways.  My aim in presenting the 
experiment is also much different than some well-known appeals to inverted qualia.  So, to preempt 
                                                          
3 In response to the van Fraassenian view that empirical models are valued primarily on the basis of  their epistemic 
adequacy, Giere (1988, pp. 193-5) has demonstrated that, in physics at least, scientists demand more of  theories than just 
adequacy. 
4 Active debates in metaphysics regarding the ontological status of  emergent “ontic structures” are a testament to this. 
5 It is to be noted that others have recognized that divergent phenomenological content may be irrelevant to 
intersubjective validations; see, for example, Shoemaker 1975, p. 293-4 and the source cited therein. 
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misguided interpretations of  what I doing in this paper, let me now explain how I will use the 
relevant terms in this project and make clear what I am not trying to show with my inverted qualia 
experiment below. 
 For starters, I will take ‘qualia’ to be aspects of  one’s personal phenomenological experience.  
When we intersubjectively validate something about the world, we are agreeing that a certain kind of  
personal qualia somehow matches up with someone else’s.  For example, if  you and I were to agree 
about the color of  an emerald green stone, we would be agreeing that we each had emerald green 
qualia associated with it.  I will then take ‘qualities’ to be the subset of  qualia that we experience-as, 
and talk about as, properties of  things in the world (cf. Heil 2003, p. 14).  For example, as I will 
understand qualities in this project, ‘emerald green’ is the qualia that we may associate with, and 
attribute as a property of, particular stones (at least pre-reflectively).  Embracing this understanding 
of  qualities, as a kind of  qualia, enables me to make a distinction between properties of  things in the 
world simpliciter, independent of  observation, and properties of  things in the world as they are 
experience phenomenally.  Accordingly, I will take ‘properties’ to be aspects of  nature—entities 
instantiated independent of  us. 
 Many philosophers employ finer-grained distinctions between physical-qualia (e.g. solidity) 
and mental-qualia (e.g. what it’s like to feel sad) and between primary (e.g. spatial extension) and 
secondary qualities (e.g. smell) (see, for example, Dancy 1985, p. 181).  Indeed, distinctions between 
qualia pertaining to “external” worldly things and “internal” mental things play substantive roles in 
many historied debates in metaphysics.  However, for the purposes of  this paper I will not employ 
such distinctions, and I’ll treat all qualia and qualities as if  they are on par; in the sense that their 
trueness or identicality to the non-qualitative properties on which they are claimed to supervene 
cannot be established (cf. Campbell 1993, pp. 253-4).  Accordingly, I will maintain a theory-neutral 
stance according to which qualities are qualia that we attribute as features of  what we perceive and 
describe or otherwise as individual entities in nature.  I adopt this neutral stance on qualities mainly 
for reasons of  economy, as finer distinctions regarding the character of  sorts of  qualia are simply 
unnecessary for the purpose of  defending realism and the “metaphysical stance.” 
 To be very clear, in this project, I am not concerned with whether some qualia are or are not 
like properties instantiated out in nature.  Because the world appears to be, “hard, cold, colourless, 
silent, and dead; a world of  quantity” independent of  our perceptions and models of  it, various 
philosophers argue that qualia are not identical to the functional processes from which they arise 
(Burt 1932, p. 237).6  I do not believe that such non-identicality or identicality can be demonstrated, 
and I will not speculate about either hypothesis herein.  In fact, I am sympathetic to Boltzman’s 
assertion that “we can know but little of  the resemblance of  our thoughts to the things to which we 
attach them” (1974, p. 214).  Accordingly, I will simply assume that the qualia we attribute as 
qualities of  things in nature are indispensable features of  the ways in which we access and ascertain 
truths about the world “out there,” but will commit to little else about the nature of  qualia. 
 Because qualities of  macro-objects are so phenomenally distinct from those of  their 
subvenient parts many philosophers have entertained the idea that they are thus robustly existent—
in the sense of  being in an ontological category distinct from their respective subvenient 
microphysical causes (see Heil 2003, p. 238).  As a final clarificatory caveat, it is to be noted that I 
will also refrain from weighing in on this ontological question in this project.  Whether or not 
qualities would appear in the completed ontology of  Laplace’s demon, I take it to be uncontentious 
that entities come to us with qualities as we may encounter or otherwise know them (cf. Williams 
                                                          
6 Even the stalwart materialist Jaegwon Kim advocates this position on the basis that it is metaphysically possible that 
different qualia may result from the same mechanisms of  contact with the same things out in the world; see 2005, pp. 
168-7. 
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2009, p. 17; Unger 2007, p. 198; Bigelow & Pargeter 1990; Blackburn 1990, p. 65).  This in no way 
implies that entities qua being exhibit properties that are like our qualia.  Nor does it imply that the 
epistemic gap between our qualia filled visions of  phenomena and the nature phenomena 
independent of  us is a narrow one (Cf. Pautz 2006).7  Even so, I think it is most plausible that 
something causes the qualia we attribute as qualities.  And I will uphold the realist idea that that 
something is the causal properties that cause the qualia perceivers like us attribute as qualities when we 
stand in appropriate perceptual relations to such properties.  I will argue moreover that our 
potentially wildly different qualitatively rich ways of  seeing things in the world most plausibly 
connect at non-qualitative (i.e. categorical and dispositional) properties in the perceiver-independent 
world, and that such causal properties are the grounds for at least some of  our empirical claims.  
The following thought experiment serves to motivate this realist conclusion. 
4. QUALIA VARIATION WORLD 
I ask you to imagine a possible world, what I will call Qualia Variation World (QVW), in which there 
are only three beings that are very much like ourselves and experience colors with their eye-like 
perceptual apparatuses as we do.  Imagine further, for the sake of  simplicity, that there are only three 
shades of  color that these beings can distinguish in their world (perhaps due to the way that light is 
reflected or the nature of  waves omitted by the sun of  QVW).  Let’s name each of  the inhabitants 
of  QVW P1, P2, and P3, and stipulate that the three distinct shades these inhabitants are able to 
perceive they have named “X,” “Y,” and “Z.”  Further, let’s say that P1’s house is painted all X, P2’s 
all Y, and P3’s all Z (as in Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
Of  course, it is possible that P1, P2, and P3 could agree that each of  their houses is a different 
shade of  the three colors that exist in QVW.  That is, each could consistently assent to the claims 
that P1’s house is a particular shade of  X, P2’s a shade of  Y, and P3’s a shade of  Z—just like any 
three people like you and I might agree about the colors of  three different houses.  These 
inhabitants of  QVW could also each consistently agree about which other things in QVW are those 
colors.  For example, P1 could have a vehicle that is the same shade of  X as her house.  What is 
interesting is that the inhabitants could agree about all of  their references to things being X, Y, or Z 
while each having completely different subjective experiences of  those colors; that is, different qualia 
for the same functional relation.  For example, P1 and P2 each standing in the ‘seeing house as X’ 
                                                          
7 It is possible that there are properties like our qualities instantiated in nature, and also possible there are many more 
qualitative properties than we can even possibly come to experience; cf. Unger 2006, p. 168.  It is also possible that 
properties are multiply natured and may each have dispositional, categorical, and/or qualitative aspects; see Chakravartty 
2007, p. 79; Heil 2003, pp. 111; 247. 
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relation, could each have completely different qualia associated with properties that they agree are X 
(as is shown in Figure 2 below).8    
To expand upon what their situation of  invisible disagreement could look like, let’s say that P1, 
2, and 3, can only distinguish five shades of  what they call “X,” “Y,” and “Z” (perhaps because of  
their physiology) and that the following color swatches match up with the three types of  subjective 
experiences of  what they call X, Y, and Z that the inhabitants of  QVW are capable of  having: 
A1-5 
 
B1-5 
 
C1-5 
 
Given all of  this, it could be that P1’s, P2’s, and P3’s intrasubjective experiences of  what they 
pick out as shades of  X, Y, and Z are undetectably very different.  More specifically, they could each 
have a drastically different phenonomenal experience of  that which they each calls “X,” “Y,” and 
“Z,” while still agreeing about which things are X, which Y, and which are Z.  For instance, each of  
their intrasubjective experiences of  things stably identified as being a shade of  X by every one of  
the inhabitants could be as follows: 
P1 experiences X shades as A1-5 [i.e. ]; 
P2 experiences X shades as B1-5 [i.e. ]; 
P3 experiences X shades as C1-5 [i.e. ]. 
Each of  their experiences of  things that they agree to be Y could be: 
P1 experiences Y shades as B1-5 [i.e. ]; 
P2 experiences Y shades as C1-5 [i.e. ]; 
P3 experiences Y shades as A1-5 [i.e. ]. 
Finally, each of  their experiences of  things that they each pick out as Z could be: 
P1 experiences Z shades as C1-5 [i.e. ]; 
P2 experiences Z shades as A1-5 [i.e. ]; 
P3 experiences Z shades as B1-5 [i.e. ]. 
 Even with this being the case, as long as each of  their personal, intrasubjective, experiences 
of  X, Y, and Z were always consistent (like all of  the things you take to be red always appear red in 
                                                          
8 It is easy to imagine that P1-3 could have distinctive qualia owing to their having different physiological process; 
perhaps due to differences in the structures of  their respective eye-like apparatuses. 
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the same sort of  way), P1, P2, and P3 would be able to communicate about X meaningfully, for 
instance, without ever being able to detect that they perceive X very differently—and so on for Z 
and Y.  More importantly, P1, P2, and P3 would remain able pick out the same properties and other 
individual entities in nature via their attributions of  those thing’s qualities, even though their 
personal experiences of  those qualities are unique and disparate. 
5.  TRACKING PHENOMENAL EXPERIENCE OR TRACKING TRULY? 
The question about the above scenario that gets down to the brass tacks of  the realist constructivst 
debate is: What is it that connects each of  the QVW inhabitant’s subjective experiences such that 
they are able to come to agreement about what they pick out as X, Y, and Z?  Baring the 
unlikelihood that they are merely very lucky—and by analogy that we have been miraculously lucky 
throughout the history of  empirical investigation—it is most plausibly whatever causes them to 
experience X, Y, and Z that their subjective experiences converge upon.9  The question is then what 
our evidence demands given that we often reach intersubjective agreement about qualities that we 
attribute to things in nature.  There are two reasonable alternatives. 
 First, such agreement may be due to intrasubjective experiences being similar.  Brian Ellis 
summarizes this sort of  view in saying that, “[t]he distinction between red and orange, for example, 
is a distinction that depends on how we see the world—that is, it depends on our color vision, and 
does not exist in the world independently of  the ways in which we process color information” 
(2001, p. 102).  This could explain our successes in agreeing about colors in this world if  our 
situation is unlike the beings in my QVW scenario.  In other words, we might agree about colors 
because our similar physiologies dictate that we have similar subjective color experiences.  However, 
this answer does not suffice to explain what is going on in QVW, and therefore fails to characterize 
our own situation if  ours’ is like that of  the inhabitants of  QVW to some extent.  So, we should 
entertain a second possible answer to the question of  what grounds such agreements. 
 This is that such agreements about the colors of  things in nature ground to causal properties 
instantiated in nature to which we attribute color qualities.  This can explain what is going on in 
QVW, as it implies the inhabitants intersubjectively validate the occurrence of  causal properties 
operative in bringing about their respective stable qualia experiences A1-5, B1-5, and C1-5.  As 
Sydney Shoemaker explains this realist view: “the relation [between distinct perceivers and the 
properties to which they map their qualia] holds intersubjectively because the properties involved in 
the intersubjective case[s] are ones that bestow intrasubjective qualitative similarity when instantiated 
in the same subject” (2007, p. 125).  I must concur with Shoemaker.  And this conclusion, and the 
fact that invisible disagreements can and do occur, bears implications for how to most reasonably 
formulate realism. 
6. REALISTS NEEDN’T COMMIT TO TRACKING QUALIA 
The most mature formulation of  realism—what Giere and other philosophers have branded 
“perspectival realism”—incorporates key elements of  constructivism (Giere 2006 and 1999; cf. 
Chakravartty 2007; Wimsatt 2007).  Perspectival realists, as realists, maintain that causal connections 
between properties instantiated in nature and ourselves ground our references to those properties, 
while at once conceding to the constructivist that our conceptions of  properties instantiated in 
nature are perspective relative—or filtered through our theoretical and perceptual perspectives.  I 
                                                          
9 Searle (1995, Ch. 8) argues that we must assume that external realism is true to communicate.  My suggestion is that the 
fact that we can communicate about the objects of  perception and intersubjectively correct for errors in our empirical 
models is compelling evidence that we detect and model the world at least partially correctly. 
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submit that this basic formulation of  realism, as perspectival realism, is right.  Yet, I submit that the 
possibility (and occurrence) of  invisible disagreements shows that certain further claims of  
perspectival realists are problematic, and that the view must be formulated in a carefully restricted 
way. 
 Particularly problematic is some perspectival realist’s presumption that our subjective 
perceptions are the same, as this goes beyond what the realist has evidence for claiming.  In fact, 
Giere himself  engages this idea (if  somewhat implicitly) in the course of  examining color vision 
experiments that show that our stable subjective color vision (e.g. seeing a certain shade of  ‘yellow’) 
can be caused by different stimuli.  Giere points to these experiments to show that what he calls 
“objective realism” does not seem to accommodate how we experience color.  He explains that 
objectivist realism is the view that empirical claims present a “literally true story of  what the world is 
like” (van Frassen 1980, p. 8).  He rebuffs this view, arguing that we are only warranted in asserting 
that our empirical claims approximate to objective truths through the lens of  our instruments, 
perceptual faculties, and models—that is, mitigated and distorted by our theoretical and perceptual 
perspectives.  He says that we are therefore warranted only in the claim that the world is “roughly 
such and such” from a well-validated perspective, and that “objective realism” is too simplistic 
(2006, p. 6).  Though I agree with this, I take issue with Giere’s implication that sharing a perspective 
on properties in nature requires having similar subjective experiences of  those properties.  A closer 
look at the color experiments just mentioned and the phenomenon of  ‘metamerism’ serves to make 
clearer why this is. 
 As Giere explains, ‘metamerism’ is: 
[P]roductions of  the same color experience by light with different spectral characteristics. For 
example, monochromatic light with a wavelength around 580nm projected on a neutral 
screen will be experienced as pure yellow […] The same color experience, however, can be 
produced by an appropriate intensity mixture of  two monochromatic lights with wavelengths 
of  540nm (a greenish yellow) and 640nm (a redish yellow). (2006, p. 21) 
He submits that this result shows that color is real, but perspectival.  Although this seems right upon 
first inspection, a more careful look shows that one cannot explain what is going on in QVW if  one 
buys into the idea that color is real only from a perspective.  Furthermore, because it is possible that 
our situation is like the inhabitants of  QVW, and most plausible that our situation mirrors theirs to a 
certain extent, it therefore comes to light that Giere’s claim to the perspectival reality of  color—i.e. 
the isomorphism of  a color to a functional perspective—is problematic.   
The crucial thing the QVW scenario highlights is that similarity of  phenomenological 
content is unnecessary for intersubjective agreement about some way the world actually is.  Thus, 
intersubjective agreement may be achieved not because of  similarities in how we each receive the 
world but because what we access out in nature somehow causes stable intrasubjective qualia when 
typical (e.g. sighted and non-hallucinating) perceivers like us stand in similar relations to those things 
out in the world.  I submit moreover that the perspectival realist must embrace this conclusion to 
maintain a coherent position.  This is because for perspectival realism to be a species of realism, and 
avoid collapsing into variation of constructivism, it must demand more than that empirical claims 
are true in virtue of grounding to a perspective or accurately describing what is perspectivally real. 
Realists must make Kitcher’s demand that empirical claims are grounded in what he calls the 
“really real.”  This is to say that good empirical claims must be about things that are “independent 
not just of each but of all of us”; that is, independent of any sapient beings beliefs, references to 
them, or observations (Kitcher 2001, p. 155; cf. Bunge 1973, p. 145).  If the inhabitants of QVW 
agree about how they each track colors, the most plausible explanation is then that what they track 
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with what they pick out as X, Y, Z are the properties out in the world that cause their respective 
subjective phenomenological content.  They do not validate their subjective perceptual content nor 
that they intersubjectively agree about their subjective experiences of X, Y, and Z, as is Giere’s 
position if we take him seriously when he says that colors are perspectivally real. 
 
Figure 2 
 
Giere is correct that, “[w]ithout perceivers like us, there would be no experiences of color” 
in the sense that there would not be color vision (1999, p. 80).  However, this does not imply that 
colors are merely perspectivally real.  What it implies is that the properties to which we attribute 
color qualities are not necessarily in fact how we perceive them.  What is real, and what grounds our 
empirical claims, is not perspective relative in the sense that it is real only from a perspective.  
Rather, how we detect the real and the interfacing formats (e.g. languages and models) we use to 
corroborate our detections are perspectival.  Still, what we intersubjectively validate is what 
properties are out in nature that we detect (as is illustrated in Figure 2).  This does not require that 
we detect what is out there the same way, even if  by similar perceptual apparatuses (e.g. our eyes).  
Indeed, it is because we validate the “out there” from different partial perspectives that we are able 
to recognize that color properties are not always, and I think most probably not ever, the way we 
perceive them. 
We know that cats lack the perceptual machinery to receive wavelengths of  light in color, 
and that some insects are apparently able to receive ultraviolet wavelengths that we cannot percieve.  
We know that individual people can see the same color properties differently, and it is simply the 
case that we may each have very different experiences of  qualities—not unlike the inhabitants of  
QVW.  This all just goes to show that subjective experiences of  things in the world are perspective 
relative, which teaches us nothing new.  Yet, recognizing that none of  this perspective relative 
variation prevents us from identifying color properties lends credence to a realist theory of  color 
according to which what we see is wavelengths of  light reflected by properties instantiated in nature. 
Empirical claims about colors are at base about properties instantiated in nature.  
Accordingly, in the case of color, what we intersubjectively validate are not claims about what we see 
but claims about what properties are instantiated out in nature.  In terms of the received account of 
color as resulting from only some wavelengths of light being reflected by the surfaces of objects, 
what is being validated are claims about the “spectral reflectance” of certain surfaces (Byrne & 
Hilbert 2003, pp. 8-9).  In other words, we are saying that certain surfaces are textured, or have 
patterned microphysical shapes, such that they produce some specific qualitative experience when 
we stand in appropriate perceptual relations to those surfaces.  If this is all right, as I am suggesting, 
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then perspectival realism should not entail that colors are real but perspectival.  Rather, perspectival 
realism should have it that colors are reflectant properties, textures, that are interpreted differently 
from different perspectives. 
7. CONCLUSION 
One cannot deny that our world is to some extent like QVW—especially since advances in 
neurobiology continue to reveal more and more that it is.  It is even very unlikely that we each have 
subjective qualia experiences that are exactly alike each other’s, given the brute fact of  physiological 
variability and the many contingent factors that may impact how we perceive things (cf. Dennett 
1988).  Indeed, one can easily alter his or her own qualia experiences simply by putting on “inversion 
goggles,” ingesting halucinagens, or starring at the sun for too long.  More to the point, upon some 
reflection I think the claim that we each have unique phenomenal experiences of  the qualities of  
things about which we agree is rather uncontroversial.  For example, I think it is most probably true 
that the very same #0064 blue color swatch looks somewhat different to each of  us.  Hence, we are 
most probably like the inhabitants of  QVW in that we have many invisible disagreements even 
though we are in strong intersubjective agreement about the qualities that we “invisibly disagree” 
about. 
In the QVW scenario, the most reasonable, explanation for the inhabitants’ intersubjective 
agreement is that specific properties and property-types out in the world cause each of  their 
respective perceptions of  color qualia.  And it is at least highly plausible that those properties, what 
colors really are, are spectrally reflectant texture properties.  In my interpretation, the inhabitants of  
QVW, P1-3, intersubjectively corroborate that they have access to the same properties in nature by 
standing in causal relations to those things so as to receive and physiologically process what they 
perceive as color qualities.10  They therefore have access to the “really real” in that there is a causal 
pathway tracing backward from effects (the qualities in their perceptions) to causes (reflectant 
properties).  Hence, their empirical claims regarding colors ground to their pointing to the same color 
causing properties of  the same objects—whatever those properties are like independent of  their 
perceptions and models of  reality.11  Accordingly, we must conclude that the grounds of  at least 
some of  our empirical claims are properties instantiated in nature.  The constructivist can only 
dogmatically allege that this realist claim goes beyond what our evidence demands and is more than 
we need as good empiricists.  However, in light of  the above considerations of  invisible 
disagreements about color, this basic realist claim appears to be exactly what we need to make sense 
of  our successes in agreeing about ways the world is. 
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10 Interestingly this is compatible with the fact that perceived qualities do not always match up to what would be 
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those that regularly correspond to the wavelengths received by the eye.  For instance, observing green color patches and 
then white or gray color patches can elicit experiencing the latter as green; see Campbell 1993, pp. 253-6.  Alternative 
examples include common cases of  color blindness; see Heil 2003, pp. 201-2. 
11 Some argue that properties of  objects are similar only if  they bring about the same qualities in their possessors; see 
Heil 2003, p. 145 and Giere 2006, p. 14.  In my view, the same properties can sometimes cause different qualia, and I 
leave open the possibility that some qualities may just be qualia that do not supervene on any other properties; cf. 
Campbell 1993, pp. 256-8. 
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